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Abstract
After the ‘CNN effect’ concept was coined two decades ago, it quickly became a popular shorthand
to understand media-conﬂict interactions. Although the connection has probably always been more
complex than what was captured in the concept, research needs to be updated in order to better
understand the multifaceted contemporary environments of both media and conﬂict. There are
growing numbers and types of media sources, and multiple interactions between media and conﬂict
actors, policymakers and engaged publics from the local to the global and back. We argue that
understanding the impact of media reporting on conﬂict requires a new framework that captures the
multilevel and hybrid media environments of contemporary conﬂicts. This study provides a roadmap
of how to systematically unpack this environment. It describes and explains how different levels,
interactions, and forms of news reporting shape conﬂicts and peacebuilding in local, national and
regional contexts, and how international responses interact with multiple media narratives. With
these tools, comprehensive understandings of contemporary local to global media interactions can be
incorporated into new research on media and conﬂict.
Keywords
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Introduction
The media is essential to any discussion about conﬂict and peace. It is not merely a medium, but also
a tool political actors employ in order to develop, reﬁne, and promote their own agendas and
strategies. It is also an independent actor that creates pressure for action on issues it deems necessary
or justiﬁed. Since the ‘CNN effect’ was ﬁrst coined in 1991 in the wake of the US intervention during
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Author’s email: margab@prio.no
The authors are ranked alphabetically reﬂecting equal contributions to this article.
1
the Kurdish crisis in Northern Iraq,1 the term has grasped a range of the novelties brought about by
live 24-hour news reporting from conﬂict scenes, and its catchiness quickly made it a popular
concept both in scholarly and policy circles. Rapid changes in the global media environment,
however, and the proliferation of conﬂict actors employing the media for strategic gain, require a
new conceptual and theoretical approach to understanding media-conﬂict interactions.
While groundbreaking technological innovations were commonplace throughout the twentieth
century, the exponential growth in digital communications technology has created an unprecedented
proliferation of media sources, and new means of media penetration into our lives. This trend is
accelerating in the twenty-ﬁrst century, and will challenge both our perceptions of, and the actual
inﬂuences between, information and political action. Although new communications technologies
are often claimed to make distant areas more accessible, their use also highlights the differences
between various conﬂict locations, old and new actors, and translation of local events through
different levels of local, national, international, and global media. Placing this trend in the context of
existing media platforms, and different geographical and cultural patterns of media use, requires
understanding how evolving media environments – including both traditional news media and
internet-based communication platforms – have inﬂuenced conﬂict dynamics.
This study offers a path towards that aim, by combining two theoretical contributions from the ﬁelds
of media and communication and postcolonial studies. In part, our approach draws upon Roger
Mac Ginty’s concept of hybridity,2 in order to show how different levels of media can be ﬂuid, and
their interactions likewise inﬂuence the outcome of both top-down and bottom-up enterprises. Our
contribution also builds on Eytan Gilboa’s approach to understanding the multilevel interactions
between local, national, regional, international, and global media.3 To paraphrase from Gretchen
Helmke and Steven Levitsky,4 our goal is to broaden the scope of media analysis by adding
multilevel interactions. In particular, we stress the need to reintroduce the ‘local’ level in current
media studies, both because media reporting on conﬂicts eventually affect the local level conﬂict and
political dynamics, and because of the discrepancies that often exist between the level where the
conﬂicts occur and how they are narrated throughout different media layers. These innovations
should enable scholars from varied disciplines to gain a better understanding of the complex
relationship between media and conﬂict, which should result in both better theory and research
1 Steven Livingston, ‘Clarifying the CNN effect: an examination of media effects according to type of military
intervention’, Harvard Research Paper R-18, Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public
Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1997); Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News
Media, Foreign Policy and Intervention (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Eytan Gilboa, ‘The CNN
effect: the search for a communication theory of International Relations’, Political Communication, 22:1
(2005a), pp. 27–44; Babak Bahador, The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West
Toward War in Kosovo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). The term ‘CNN effect’ is almost antiquated
now given the proliferation of media outlets and types of media, but it remains an important research pin to
bridge the gap between previous and contemporary work.
2 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid peace: the interaction between top down and bottom up peace’, Security Dialogue,
41:4 (2009), pp. 391–412; Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms
of Peace (London: Palgrave, 2011).
3 Eytan Gilboa, ‘Media coverage of international negotiation: a taxonomy of levels and effects’, International
Negotiation, 5:3 (2000), pp. 543–68; Eytan Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict resolution: a framework for analysis’,
Marquette Law Review, 93:1 (2009a), pp. 87–111.
4 Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, ‘Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research agenda’,
Perspectives on Politics, 2:4 (2004), pp. 725–40 (p. 726).
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which is sensitive to the permeability, interactions and mutual inﬂuences between different levels of
media that affect conﬂict dynamics and conﬂict responses.
This study starts by ﬁrst outlining the existing scholarship on media and conﬂict, including the CNN
literature, and notes, in particular, its Western-centric focus and inattention to the inﬂuences of local
reporting on local conﬂict dynamics and external responses to them. We then highlight two areas
that must be accounted for in research today: (1) the multiplication and fragmentation of media
outlets and their subsequent impact upon twenty-ﬁrst-century newsgathering technology; and (2) the
role of local media such as outlets based in conﬂict districts or regions, or national media that cover
conﬂicts in their immediate periphery. The study then introduces the concepts of hybridity and
multilevel interactions and discusses their utility for understanding better contemporary media-
conﬂict dynamics. Building upon this conceptual basis, we conclude by setting out ﬁve new research
streams that can enable researchers to harness the interaction effects from the local to the global and
help to better understand contemporary media-conﬂict interactions.
Media and conflict from the Cold War to today
The literature on the CNN effect is only one element of a broader body of work on media-conﬂict
interactions. The largest body is the substantial and longstanding literature on the relationship
between media and war,5 most of which has highlighted the propensity for news media to mobilise in
support of government war aims and focuses upon Western (mainly US) initiated conﬂicts, or
so-called limited wars of national interest.6 In this scenario, patterns of media deference to political
elites, elite propaganda campaigns, as well as other ideological imperatives mean that media
frequently serve as a critical tool in exacerbating or even instigating conﬂict. The CNN effect
literature, at least initially, presented an alternative reading of the relationship between media and
conﬂict, and focused on the emerging 24-hour all news global providers (then dominated by CNN)
as well as traditional broadcast media (TV news and broadsheet newspapers), to better understand
how real-time reporting facilitated by portable satellite and electronic newsgathering equipment
inﬂuenced the making of news, and their effects on policymaking.7 Most of the CNN effect
scholarship focused on the inﬂuence of US domestic media and CNN on US-led military interven-
tions in humanitarian crises such as the 1991 Kurdish crisis in Northern Iraq, Somalia in 1991–2,
Bosnia in 1994–5 and Kosovo in 1999. As such, this analysis conceptualised media as a largely
domestic-level inﬂuence over government decisions for or against intervention into humanitarian
crises in regions with relatively low inherent strategic value, so-called ‘other people’s wars’. Smaller
5 W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (eds), Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign
Policy in the Gulf War (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994); Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The
Media and Vietnam (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Edward S. Herman and Noam
Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988);
Glasgow Media Group, War and Peace News (Glasgow: Glasgow University, 1985); Piers Robinson, Peter
Goddard, Katy Parry, Craig Murray, and Philip Taylor, Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and
Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010).
6 Susan Carruthers, The Media at War (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2011).
7 Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas George Weiss, The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Eytan Gilboa, ‘Global communication and foreign policy’, Journal of
Communication, 52:4 (2002a), pp. 731–48; Eytan Gilboa, ‘Global communication and foreign policy:
Debating the CNN effect’, International Studies Perspectives, 6:3 (2005b), pp. 325–41; Livingston, ‘Clarifying
the CNN effect’; Robinson, The CNN Effect; Bahador, The CNN Effect in Action.
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bodies of literature have examined other aspects of media-conﬂict interactions, including the role
of television8 and radio9 within conﬂict zones, especially during the dissolution of the former
Yugoslavia and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
The CNN effect scholarship and related research has provided important insights into US media
inﬂuences on policymaking during humanitarian crises. Empirical research revealed contextual factors
such as levels of national interest, policy certainty and types of humanitarian response.10 This research
built a deeper conceptual understanding of the variety of roles the media play as well as encouraged
new conceptualisations of how and why the media inﬂuence government responses to conﬂicts.
Theoretical progress also led to multidirectional conceptualisations of government-media relations11
that highlighted the signiﬁcant inﬂuence that political elites have over media coverage, and the
circumstances in which media can play a more independent and inﬂuential role. Research has also
shown that media can play a more divisive than constructive role during critical moments.12 Several
scholars also point to the ability of rival actors to inﬂuence international media coverage to support
their cause, from agenda setting and framing to facilitating diplomatic and military assistance.13
Owing to the focus on armed responses during humanitarian crises, the analytical centre of gravity of the
CNN effect literature focused on media within ‘hot’ phases of conﬂict. Less attention has been paid to
the roles of media in postconﬂict reconstruction and peacebuilding, peace processes,14 or conﬂict
prevention.15 Existing research on conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding has highlighted the inadequacy
8 James Gow, Richard Patterson, and Alison Preston (eds), Bosnia by Television (London: British Film
Institute, 1996).
9 Christine Kellow and H. Leslie Steeves, ‘The role of radio in the Rwandan Genocide’, Journal of Communication,
48:3 (1998), pp. 107–28.
10 Nik Gowing, ‘Real-time television coverage of armed conﬂicts and diplomatic crises: Does it pressure or distort
foreign policy decisions?’, Harvard Working Paper (Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on
the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University, 1994); Martin Shaw, Civil Society and Media in
Global Crises (London: St Martin’s Press, 1996); Warren Strobel, Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News
Media’s Inﬂuence on Peace Operations (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997); Minear,
Scott, and Weiss, The News Media; Livingston, ‘Clarifying the CNN effect’; Robinson, The CNN Effect;
Gilboa, ‘The CNN effect’; Gilboa, ‘Global communication and foreign policy’; Bahador, The CNN Effect in
Action.
11 Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004); Robinson, The CNN Effect; Wolfsfeld, The Media and Political Conﬂict.
12 Phyllis A. Anastasio, Karen Rose, and Judith Chapman, ‘The divisive coverage effect: How media may cleave
differences of opinion between social groups’, Communication Research, 32:2 (2005), pp. 171–92.
13 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Victors and victims: Reﬂections on the Kosovo War’, Review of International Studies,
26:3 (2000), pp. 335–8; Moran Yarchi, Gadi Wolfsfeld, Tamir Sheafer, and Shaul Shenhav, ‘Promoting stories
about terrorism to the international news media: a study of public diplomacy’, Media, War and Conﬂict, 6:3
(2013), pp. 263–78.
14 Gadi Wolfsfeld, The Media and Political Conﬂict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Gadi
Wolfsfeld, Media and the Path to Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Gilboa, ‘Media
coverage of international negotiation’; Gilboa, ‘Global communication and foreign policy’; Eytan Gilboa (ed.),
Media and Conﬂict: Framing Issues, Making Policy, Shaping Opinions (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers,
2002b); Eytan Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict resolution’, in Jacob Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk, and I. William
Zartman (eds), Sage Handbook on Conﬂict Resolution (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009b), pp. 457–76; Greg
McLaughlin and Stephen Baker, The Propaganda of Peace: The Role of Media and Culture in the Northern
Ireland Peace Process (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2010).
15 Christoph O. Meyer, Chiara de Franco, John Brante, and Florian Otto, Heeding Warnings about War?
Persuasion and Learning in Conﬂict Prevention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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of the media as an early warning or preventative actor.16 As journalistic news tends to focus on drama, it
generally avoids situations that have yet to reach a crisis point. Conﬂict coverage is also selective and
signiﬁcant violent conﬂicts are often ignored such as recently in the Sudan and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.17 Such assessments have fed into a broader set of criticisms concerning the media tendency
to encourage short-term ‘ﬁreﬁghting’ responses by the international community that shift resources away
from conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding. An extensive literature has also emerged critiquing the
top-down and ethnocentric nature of what were usually US and Western-led responses and the failure
of journalists, humanitarian actors and policymakers to adequately comprehend the needs of people in
war-torn societies.18 Little work has been done to unpack this assumption or explore more systematically
the relationship between media and humanitarian responses.
The geopolitical and technological context of media-conﬂict interactions has, however, changed over
the last 15 years and scholarly attention needs refocusing in four ways. First, it is worth modifying
the sharp distinction between ‘wars of national interest’ and intervention in ‘other people’s wars’. On
the one hand, wars of national interest are now frequently fought within the context of a huma-
nitarian narrative; witness the ‘peacebuilding’ dimensions of the Western military action in Iraq and
Afghanistan. On the other hand, most ‘humanitarian’ interventions in the 1990s involved substantial
elements of national interest and realpolitik.19 The lines between these different types of conﬂict are
further blurred by the ‘war on terror’ and the asymmetric nature of many contemporary conﬂicts.20
Rather than maintaining a sharp distinction between ‘our wars’ and ‘other people’s wars’, or wars of
‘national interest’ and ‘humanitarian’ war, etc., we can understand contemporary conﬂicts as lying
somewhere along a continuum which includes space for a number of different media-conﬂict
interactions. The theory development detailed in this article is intended, therefore, to be applicable to
all of these various media-conﬂict formulations.
Second, the research on foreign policy-media relationship focuses on Western, mainly US, cases, and
this needs rectifying. This is partly due to renewed recognition of the importance of the ‘glocal’/local
dimension of conﬂicts, and the need to move beyond research which assumes that Western media
and Western foreign policy is the beginning and the end of the story. But it is also demanded by the
16 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Counter point: Focus on the CNN effect misses the point: the real media impact on
conﬂict management is invisible and indirect’, Journal of Peace Research, 37:2 (2000), pp. 131–43; Eytan
Gilboa, ‘Media and international conﬂict’, in Jennifer Oetzel and S. Ting-Toomey (eds), The SAGE Handbook
of Conﬂict Communication: Integrating Theory, Research, and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publica-
tions, 2006), pp. 595–626; Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict resolution’; Christoph Meyer and Florian Otto (eds),
‘Missing the story? Changes in foreign news reporting and their implications for conﬂict prevention’, Media,
War and Conﬂict, 5:3 (2012), pp. 205–21.
17 Virgil Hawkins, Stealth Conﬂicts: How the World’s Worst Violence is Ignored (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008);
Steven Livingston, ‘The CNN effect reconsidered (again): Problematizing ICT and global governance in the
CNN effect research agenda’, Media, War and Conﬂict, 4:1 (2011), pp. 20–36; Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert,
‘Activist mobilization and the internationalization of the Darfur crisis’, in Barbara Casciarri, Munzoul,
A. M. Assal, and Francois Ireton (eds), Multidimensional Change in the Republic of Sudan (1989–2011)
(New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015).
18 Jakobsen, ‘Counter point’; Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conﬂict (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Hybrid peace: the interaction between top down and
bottom up peace’, Security Dialogue, 41:4 (2009), pp. 391–412.
19 Piers Robinson, ‘The CNN effect revisted’, Critical Studies in Communication, 22:4 (2005), pp. 344–9.
20 Nathan Rogers, Image Warfare in the War in Terror (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Amil Ayalon, Elad
Popovich, and Moran Yarchi ‘From warfare to image warfare: How states should manage asymmetric conﬂicts
with extensive media coverage’, Terrorism and Political Violence (2014), pp. 1–20.
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nature of the twenty-ﬁrst-century media environment, which involves global and local media
operating in the context of the Internet and the ubiquity of digital communication. This new reality
also establishes a third reason for broadening the focus of media-conﬂict research to include the
patterns of multiplication, fragmentation, and new communication technology, and we detail these
developments in the next section.
Fourth, given the nature of the contemporary media environment, in which traditional news media
outlets coexist alongside (and contribute to) social media such as Twitter and YouTube, whilst mobile
phones and Internet access are widespread, it is important to work with a broad deﬁnition of what
constitutes politically signiﬁcant media, and move beyond the traditional focus on mainstream broadcast
news media. At the same time, while engaging with and within cutting-edge social media is essential for
media research, an overreliance on any one technology that might be portrayed as the ‘future’ of
communication risks becoming an obsolete venture before studies are even funded, let alone published.
Moreover, each conﬂict setting may see different social media actors in driving roles: SMS and Facebook
messaging may be ubiquitous in one conﬂict, Twitter and YouTube in another, and locally-rooted social
media in yet another. Noting recent works on speciﬁc social media and their respective abilities or lack
thereof, to serve as truly path-breaking tools or mechanisms of policy inﬂuence,21 we maintain focus on
the inﬂuence of all media outlets upon policy, conﬂict, and peacebuilding as opposed to encouraging
point-speciﬁc studies on any one means of internet or social media communication. Thus, we recommend
an ‘information ecology’ perspective on new media,22 allowing researchers to ﬂexibly study change as
new technologies and institution morphologies present themselves while tempering the importance of
chasing the ‘latest’ technologies in the ﬁeld. This distinction enables scholars to decouple the increasingly
complementary and melded – but distinct - roles of technology in conﬂict and peacebuilding from the
role of media.
With these points in mind, we now turn to a fuller discussion of two of these key areas, points two
and three above, which require greater theoretical and empirical engagement: (1) the multiplication
and fragmentation of media outlets and their subsequent impact upon twenty-ﬁrst-century news-
gathering technology; (2) the role of local-level media such as media outlets based in conﬂict districts
or regions or national media that cover conﬂicts in their immediate periphery.
Changes in the media environment
Changes in the media environment inevitably introduce uncertainty about the validity of the existing
research on media-conﬂict interactions. Today’s range of new, competing and alternative media
21 See, for example, on Twitter: Dhiraj Murthy, Twitter (London: Polity, 2012); on video/YouTube communication:
Thomas N. Smyth, John Etherton, and Michael Best, ‘MOSES: Exploring new ground in media and post-conﬂict
reconciliation’, CMI Proceedings of the CIGCHI Conference, available at: {http://mikeb.inta.gatech.edu/uploads/
papers/pap0922-smyth.pdf}; on ‘electronic elites’: Steven Livingston and Gregory Asmolov, ‘Networks and the
future of foreign affairs reporting’, Journalism Studies, 11:5 (2010), pp. 745–60; on social media as propaganda in
the Middle East: Hyunjin Seo, ‘Visual propaganda in the age of social media: an empirical analysis of Twitter
images during the 2012 Israeli-Hamas conﬂict’, Visual Communication Quarterly, 21:3 (2014); Eytan Gilboa,
‘Digital diplomacy’, in Costas Constantinou, Paul Sharp, and Pauline Kerr (eds), Sage Handbook of Diplomacy
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, in press).
22 Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Livingston, ‘The CNN effect reconsidered (again)’.
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outlets has increased along with a rise in global demand. It has also become more diverse with the
rise of specialist and niche media sites challenging the dominance and legitimacy of traditional news,
and it has converged as previously discrete media including print, television, radio, and interactive
technologies have coalesced around their internet footprints.23
Throughout the world, the multiplication of media outlets and audiences who have access to them
are staggering, even in developing states. For example, Sudanese citizens living in Khartoum may be
informed about events in the western Darfur province through reading a Khartoum-based paper,
listening to radio, watching TV reports, viewing Al Jazeera’s perspective, or reading Internet reports
or an activist blog in the US.24 Especially in fragile states, informal (local) media ﬂows are
increasingly important and relied upon.25 Likewise, diaspora communities can now stay much more
actively and easily engaged by following not only news at the local and national level of the country
they live in, but also by following local and national news streamed from their homeland through the
Internet. For example, Pakistanis living in Norway may follow Pakistan’s engagement in the ‘War on
Terror’ through Norwegian news channels and newspapers, but also through regional European and
international news sources, and also or instead, through Pakistan-based news outlets. In addition,
political leanings have become marketised in many media environments, encouraging the fragmenta-
tion of the media landscape as outlets seek to develop unique ‘voices’ in the ﬁeld – and often adjust
their reporting of news to suit a political agenda. In conﬂict zones, this has encouraged media outlets to
trumpet xenophobic, jingoistic, and otherwise violence-inducing information in the name of increasing
market share, and has also encouraged conﬂict actors themselves to establish media outlets. Coverage
has become more fragmented, polarised, and opinionated as outlets have multiplied.26
While the number of media outlets available to audiences has proliferated, the technologies available
for news gathering have profoundly changed. For journalists, lightweight and portable editing and
satellite communication equipment allows easy and rapid reporting from conﬂict zones27 and
potentially decreases the reliance and inﬂuence of ofﬁcial sources upon reporting. But newer forms of
journalism have also emerged. Mobile phones enable video and photographs to be instantly taken,
and then rapidly circulated over the Internet, thus enabling the emergence of citizen journalism.28
Internet platforms including Twitter and Facebook and other ‘Web 2.0’ communication media have
also dramatically increased the ﬂow of news information between individuals and can themselves
23 Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War (Cambridge:
Polity, 2010).
24 Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, The Internationalization of the Sudanese Conﬂicts from South Sudan to Darfur:
Agenda-setting, Mobilization and Qualiﬁcations (PhD thesis, SciencesPo, Paris, 2010).
25 Nicole Stremlau, ‘Towards a diagnostic approach to media in fragile states: Examples from the Somali terri-
tories’, Media, War and Conﬂict, 6:3 (2013), pp. 279–93.
26 Matthew A. Baum and Tim Groeling, ‘News media and the polarization of American political discourse’,
Political Communication, 25:4 (2008), pp. 345–56.
27 Steven Livingston and W. Lance Bennett, ‘Gatekeeping, indexing and live-event news: is technology altering the
construction of news?’, Political Communication, 20:4 (2003), pp. 363–80; Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert and
David Lanz, ‘Globalised rebellion: the Darfur insurgents and the world’, Journal of Modern African Studies,
51:2 (2013), pp. 193–217.
28 Stuart Allan, Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives (New York: Peter Lang, 2009). This development has
also resulted in efforts by states to censor or shut off their Internet entirely when particularly emotive images
are shared, as India has done over one dozen times in 2015. See Jason Miklian and Sangeeta Rane, ‘India’s
dangerous digital curfews’, Foreign Policy, December (2015), available at: {http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/
03/india-dangerous-digital-curfews_modi_censorship/}; Jason Miklian, ‘The political ecology of war in Maoist
India’, Conﬂict, Security and Development, 13:4 (2013), pp. 561–76.
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serve as major sources of breaking news.29 Overall, it is often argued that the contemporary media
environment has created a myriad of diverse, pluralised, and fragmented interconnections and
information ﬂows.30 At the same time, media multiplication and fragmentation diversity has been
simultaneously contained or constrained by the continued predominance of major corporations’
ownership of media outlets and the impact of capitalism on the fabric of the Internet.31
The net effect of these developments is ambiguous. As with the CNN effect debate of the 1990s, many
scholars and observers are drawing links that assume that policymakers are ﬁrst engaged viewers
themselves of real-time news before they become active participants in the news cycle through policy
action. Certainly, the range and potential persuasive power of today’s news media is impressive and
includes traditional news media in both their online and traditional print and broadcast incarnations,
the global news media such as CNN International, BBC World and Al Jazeera, and online media
including alternative websites and social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.
At the same time, the prevalence of asymmetric conﬂict, exempliﬁed by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and conﬂict associated with the ‘War on Terror’, combined with the highly
visual nature of the contemporary media environment has, according to some, elevated the importance
of image warfare. Scholars argued, for example,32 that groups such as Al Qaeda (and now ISIS) are
highly adept at projecting power and inﬂuence via emotive and threatening images.33 For these
scholars, images have become as powerful, if not more so, than traditional military capabilities. For
other commentators, new media appears to shape public understandings of conﬂicts rapidly and in
unforeseen ways, with certain events suddenly becoming a central focus of attention, while other also
seemingly newsworthy issues remain in the shadow. Witness the outcry from Invisible Children’s
Kony2012 video and its backlash, Nobel Laureate Malala Yousafzai’s struggle in Pakistan and her
subsequent international campaign supported by western media agencies, and the avalanche of Twitter
follows for Libyan and Syrian citizen journalists by concerned global citizens as they attempted to gain
unvarnished access to ‘truth’ in reporting on the Syrian conﬂict and ISIS atrocities.
Critically, however, new media technologies might variously empower or disempower political
actors, as increased visibility is not necessarily synonymous with increased political inﬂuence.
Patterns of fragmentation and multiplication and technological developments appear to muddy the
processes by which political actors attempt to promote coherent frames or ‘strategic narratives’ that
can inﬂuence and shape conﬂict responses.34 For states involved in offensive military action, such as
29 Pew, The State of the News Media 2012, Pew Research Centre: Project for Excellence in Journalism,
Washington, DC (2012).
30 Simon Cottle, Mediatized Conﬂict: Developments in Media and Conﬂict Studies (Maidenhead: Open University
Press, 2006); Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
31 Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times (New York:
The New Press, 2015) and Digital Disconnect (New York: The New Press, 2013).
32 Rogers, Image Warfare; Amil Ayalon, Elad Popovich, and Moran Yarchi, ‘From warfare to image warfare:
How states should manage asymmetric conﬂicts with extensive media coverage’, Terrorism and Political
Violence (2014), pp. 1–20.
33 These criticisms are well established by current research. See, for example, Marie Gillespie, ‘Transnational
television audiences after September 11’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32:6 (2006), pp. 97–137;
Sayed Askar Mousavi, ‘Transnational Afghani audiences after September 11’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, 32:6 (2006), pp. 1041–61.
34 Nik Gowing, ‘Time to move on: New media realities-new vulnerabilities of power’, Media, War and Conﬂict,
4:1 (2011), pp. 13–19.
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the Western operations in Iraq (2003–9), Afghanistan (2001–present) and now against ISIS, such
developments in the media environment appear, at least to some, to reduce the ability of powerful
states to inﬂuence and mobilise support for their actions, amongst domestic and global audiences and
populations within conﬂict zones.35 The diverse new media environment may have contradictory
consequences for international responses to conﬂict and humanitarian crises, for example, by
increasing the range of media available to actors trying to mobilise responses to a crisis, but
decreasing the ability of any one group to inﬂuence public and political awareness, precisely because
of the diffusion of media outlets and the fragmentation of audiences. The quality of awareness also
needs to be considered, as heavy media attention to misconceived aspects of a conﬂict can have
deleterious consequences.36
Key questions are whether the domestic and global public spheres are becoming more information
rich at the expense of timely responses to humanitarian crises, what are the effects of different types
of media on political action, and do the media facilitate or complicate such action.37 While social
networking and mobile communications might facilitate certain media-conﬂict relationships, these
might differ from those triggered by ‘global’ media outlets such as CNN and Al Jazeera. With a
nearly full adoption rate by Western journalists in less than ﬁve years, Twitter in particular
may actually be serving as a source of over-reliance or echo chamber for communication
professionals. Moreover, recent evidence suggests a distinct sequencing of the media-politics cycle,
with an upsurge in social media coverage often following rather than sparking more traditional
media coverage.38
Today’s information environment also shapes the ways in which publics, policymakers, humani-
tarian actors, and actors within conﬂict zones themselves understand conﬂicts. In some cases, this
environment serves to multiply the existing internal factions in a society, working against the
building of mutual understanding amongst and between conﬂicting parties. In others, the news
media is seen as a tool for conﬂict resolution and bridge-building, even in the context of multi-
plication and fragmentation. Alternative news sources and social media are becoming integrated in
news reports in ways that appear to increase transparency, awareness, and understanding, but these
technologies may simply perpetuate greater fragmentation, or be largely peripheral to mainstream
media representations of conﬂict.
Overall, the nature and dynamics of connected, but fragmented, public spheres and the ways in
which the locus of discursive power can shift in this media environment certainly necessitates
moving beyond traditional state-centric Western political communication models dominating
the literature reviewed earlier, and toward a genuinely global understanding of media dynamics
that enables understanding of the ways in which the visibility and invisibility of conﬂicts is
shaped. In particular, these developments require a new focus on the local conﬂict-media
dynamics.
35 Hoskins and O’Loughlin, War and Media.
36 A vivid example is the anti-refugee reaction by politicians in both Europe and the United States underpinned in
misinformation that circulated immediately following the November 2015 Paris attacks by ISIS.
37 Piers Robinson, ‘News media, communication technology and humanitarianism’, in Roger Mac Ginty and
Jenny Peterson (eds), Routledge Handbook on Humanitarian Action (London and New York:
Routledge, 2015).
38 Zvi Bar’el, ‘Social media only played a supporting role in the Arab Spring’, Haaretz (20 December 2012),
available at: {http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/social-media-only-played-a-supporting-role-in-the-
arab-spring.premium-1.486132} accessed 8 January 2016.
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The forgotten importance of the local and the ‘glocal’
As a counterbalance to the focus of existing literature on the foreign policy of Western governments
and media and their relationship to domestic audiences, the local media level should constitute a core
focus of future media research for a number of reasons. First, local and regional media dynamics
within conﬂict zones are equally important. Media organisations are now present in previously
underserved peripheral and rural markets, particularly in the developing world, and various non-elite
actors seeking to inﬂuence political processes have new forms of access to media. Today, the time
between the outbreak of violent conﬂict and information reaching international audiences is sig-
niﬁcantly reduced, no matter how remote a conﬂict might be. Conﬂict actors themselves may act as
media outlets, releasing video and other electronic materials designed to draw attention to their cause.
Even if conﬂict events are not determined to be ‘newsworthy’ by international media actors,
social media and other Internet-based outputs ﬁll the gaps.39 The much faster pace however, is
potentially damaging upon the reliability, authenticity and accuracy in representation of local
actors as this material is often assumed to have comparable precision to that produced by major
media outlets.
Second, just as the media context is changing, so too is the international agenda for conﬂict and
conﬂict-response. The 9/11 attacks have increased criticisms of Western reporting bias among dif-
ferent audiences, particularly in the Muslim world. This is a process of fundamental transformation
where new social media have been seen to play a key yet underexplored role. International orga-
nisations and donors are showing more sophisticated understandings of the complexity and tra-
jectory of violent conﬂict, and increasingly argue that bottom-up processes should be
accommodated. The UN, World Bank, and others have produced a range of new conﬂict response
policy documents that call for a fuller picture of local aspirations and conditions in conﬂict zones.40
Orthodox and institutional means of information-gathering such as embassies and diplomatic
channels, must be augmented by other methods, including the media and social media.41 The ‘Arab
Spring’, the recent disintegration of the Middle East and other developments continue to catch
Western governments and other ‘experts’ off guard, and have reinforced the idea that the ways
governments, international organisations, and other actors gather information from conﬂict and
preconﬂict regions must be reassessed.
Third, interaction between conﬂict and reporting at all levels affect conﬂict dynamics and policies.
This includes study of the creation and promotion of local media narratives arising from local-level
conﬂict events, and the changes these narratives undertake as information trickles up from the local,
through the national and the international and often back down to local politics and local media.
Two current examples of this are the understudied local-international interactions in the ongoing
Ukraine and Syrian conﬂicts, and how duelling subnational, national, regional, and international
39 Stuart Allan, Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives (New York: Peter Lang, 2009); Philip Howard, The
Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
40 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile
States, International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Paris, 2011); World Bank, Human Develop-
ment Report, Conﬂict Security and Development (Washington, DC, 2011); United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract, United Nations (New York, 2011).
41 State Department of the United States Government (State Department), Interagency Conﬂict Assessment
Framework, Washington, DC, n.d.; Daryl Copeland,Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009).
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accounts inﬂuence local perceptions. These narratives impact upon conﬂict response policies. On this
front, the ‘event-driven news thesis’42 comes up across a range of the media-state relations litera-
ture43 as a key variable concerning the disruption of prevailing power-relations between political
actors and media. Research that traces how events cascade through global media, global politics, and
then through domestic politics, and determines the effects in terms of substantive political inﬂuence is
much needed and can make a major contribution.
Fourth, the ‘local’ is where the conﬂict takes place, yet it is often distorted, romanticised or ignored in
media and policy framings.44 Local-level media within conﬂict zones is a potentially powerful actor,
especially vis-à-vis national-level ‘ofﬁcial/establishment’ media. Often conﬂict actors (local, national,
or international) seek to promote a hegemonic narrative of the conﬂict whilst innate ethno-centricism
frequently shapes the way in which the suffering of one or other side in a conﬂict is differentially
framed.45 The multiplicity of media sources, and the peculiarities of local media, means that proto-
hegemonic narratives may be contested or rebutted.46 New media also makes the circulation of
alternative scripts more accessible, but it can come at the expense of reducing the availability or
penetration of more established and vetted news sources in favour of more sensationalist or
polemical alternatives. As ‘grand schematic visions’ of conﬂicts are circulated through international
media they rarely do justice to local complexities and needs. The study of disparate local media
sources, especially social media voices, can provide a window into these subnational variations in
ways that looking at national-level media alone cannot.47
Fifth, for local conﬂict actors, dispersing news about their struggle is an increasingly important
tool to obtain international recognition, legitimacy, or material resources.48 By distinguishing
characteristics between deliberate conﬂict actor media strategies, and internal outcries for help or
external calls to ‘Do Something!’, we may be able to unlock how local conﬂict actors engage
with local and national media to win ‘hearts and minds’ in their own societies, and thus directly
or indirectly shape the ways local conﬂicts are framed. There is also over-writing of local narratives
and local experiences, by imposed narratives as local understandings of conﬂicts have been
‘reconstructed’ and ‘translated’ into conﬂicts more understandable to outside observers.49 This
renders as malleable the ownership of narratives and connects with recent literature on the experi-
ential aspects of war.50 It also risks turning the victims, participants, and bystanders of conﬂicts into
42 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Victors and victims: Reﬂections on the Kosovo War’, Review of International Studies,
26:3 (2000), pp. 335–8.
43 Wolfsfeld, The Media and Political Conﬂict, Gilboa, ‘Global communication and foreign policy’; W. Lance
Bennett, Steven Livingston, and Regina Lawrence,When the Press Fails (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007); Robinson et al., Pockets of Resistance.
44 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding.
45 Gadi Wolfsfeld, Paul Frosch, and Awabdy, ‘Covering death in conﬂicts: Coverage of the second intifada on
Israeli and Palestinian television’, Journal of Peace Research, 45:3 (2008), pp. 401–17.
46 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Lessons from the Northern Ireland: Bad students learning the wrong lessons?’, in Nicholas
Kitchen (ed.), DEAS reports, special reports SR008, LSE IDEAS (London School of Economics and Political
Science: London, 2011b).
47 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1992).
48 Gabrielsen Jumbert and Lanz, ‘Globalised rebellion’.
49 A. S. Sasso, N. Bekdache, and I. S. Hassan, ‘Beyond compensation: the post-war reconstruction battles of “Aita
al-Cha’b”’, in H. Al-Harithy (ed.), Lessons in Post-War Reconstruction: Case Studies From Lebanon in the
Aftermath of the 2006 War (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 158–86.
50 Christine Sylvester (ed.), Experiencing War (London: Routledge, 2010).
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‘subjects’ with limited agency and limited ability to tell their own story.51 Thus, it is necessary to take
a step back from the ‘conceit’ of many contemporary Western epistemologies and methodologies,
and recognise that there are limits to the extent to which the complex interactionism of a conﬂict
zone can be rendered into neat schemata for global audiences.52
Multilevel hybridity: Exploring new media-conflict interactions
What should be clear from the discussion thus far is that, from global to local levels, the degree of
interconnectivity enabled by digital Internet-based media creates a multifaceted environment and one
in which local-level media-conﬂict dynamics interact with global and Western media-policy
dynamics. In order to make sense of these complex relationships, Mac Ginty’s53 concept of hybridity,
in combination with Gilboa’s concept of multilevel interactions, can be employed to understand
dynamics between political actors and media.
Hybridity
Hybridity suggests that peace, security, development, and reconstruction in societies emerging from
violent conﬂict tend to be a hybrid between the external and the local. In peacebuilding, internationally
supported peace operations meet local approaches to peace that may draw on traditional, indigenous,
and customary practice. Hybridity does not envisage the simple joining together of two separate
processes to create a new third entity. Instead, it rests on the notion of ‘prior hybridity’ whereby all
actors are the result of constant processes of social negotiations, conﬂict and coalescence.54
Hybridity is a means of capturing complexity and can make comprehensible the kinds of interaction
between local, national and international media, audiences, and conﬂict actors discussed in the
previous section.55 The analytical lens offered by hybridity allows scholars to maintain the impor-
tance of agency at all levels, viewing the media as both a bottom-up and top-down enterprise, in
which power is distributed across different types of media and in a manner that captures the
signiﬁcance of the all important local/glocal dimensions highlighted earlier. Hybridity also
encourages a close look at the local media reactions to top-down (national and international media),
and at the variance of alternative and new media without excluding more traditional forms of media.
Moreover, hybridity allows us to investigate how media shapes conﬂict dynamics, with a range of
factors uniting to produce a complex landscape of reportage, dissemination and understanding of
policy change. Here hybridity appears particularly suited to the understanding of the patterns of
multiplication and fragmentation discussed earlier. By focusing on relationships and interactions,
hybridity encourages scholars to examine multiple information transmission routes and captures the
impact of a complex media environment on the evolution of conﬂict and peace. This involves the
dissemination and evolution of media narratives, as they experience distortion, blowback, and
51 James C. Scott, Decoding Subaltern Politics: Ideology, Disguise and Resistance in Agrarian Politics (London:
Routledge, 2013).
52 Patrick Chabal, ‘How can Africa develop? Reﬂections on theories, concepts, policies and realities’, in Jon Abbink
and Mirjam de Brujin (eds), Land, Law and Politics in Africa: Reshaping the State (Leiden, Netherlands:
Brill, 2011).
53 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding.
54 Nestor Garcia Canclini, Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
55 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding.
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change. Important here is the sequencing of the news-conﬂict relationship, and the attempted and
actual ownership of media narratives.
The hybridity concept helps us understand how complex media dynamics impact upon the policy-
making and public spheres where attitudes and policies towards conﬂict situations are debated and
decided. Diaspora engagement with conﬂict can illustrate the actionable components of hybridity of
media spheres in practice. As a consequence of immigration to Europe, migrants’ sustained trans-
national ties and developments in communications technologies over the past decades, interest in
media and minorities in a multicultural Europe has emerged.56 But mainstream media engages with
and represents minority populations, and alternative and minority media provide counter-voices to
dominant discourses. The latter is especially evident when minority communities in Europe have
links with secessionist or insurgent groups in their country of origin.
The media scene in contemporary Europe is a stage where conﬂicts of interests and struggles over
identity and power of deﬁnition are played out, where a hybridisation of the media sphere is evident.
Much of this interaction occurs at the transnational level, with dedicated diaspora TV channels,
kinship networks, governments, INGOs, and others all attempting to inﬂuence the conﬂict narrative.57
Using hybridity encourages a look beyond the ‘ofﬁcial transcripts’ of government statements and state-
run media, to the multiplicity of media offerings, how they interact and competitively seek to inﬂuence
conﬂict-response policy. The use of media to inﬂuence conﬂict situations is not new, but changes in
communications technologies have increased the capability of conﬂict actors – especially in the
diaspora – to use media as a strategic tool. The movement for democratisation of Myanmar, with their
radio, television, and website ‘Democratic Voice of Burma’ is an example of an opposition group that
has used media strategically, both in the European diaspora and vis-à-vis the country of
origin population and government, as well as an ofﬁcial lobby tool targeting the international
community.58
Multilevel analysis
Whilst the concept of hybridity provides a useful organising backdrop, greater analytical precision
can be obtained by its integration with Gilboa’s59 six levels for media analysis. This helps to clarify
and consolidate the multilevel approach to assessing how media on the local, national, regional,
international, and global levels interact,60 and adds important research space to the existing
national-level focus of media’s inﬂuence on policy outcomes. An example taxonomy is listed thus:
Local: City / district-level outlets not intent on or capable of reaching national audiences
National: New York Times, CNN-US, BBC-UK, CNN-IBN (India)
Regional: Al Jazeera (Arabic), Al-Arabia, SABC, TeleSUR
International: VOA, Al Jazeera International, Russia Today, France 24, CCTV
56 Roger Silverstone and Myria Georgiou, ‘Editorial Introduction: Media and minorities in multicultural Europe’,
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31:3 (2005), pp. 433–41.
57 Paul Adams and Rina Ghose, ‘India.com: the construction of a space between’, Progress in Human Geography,
27:4 (2003), pp. 414–37.
58 Noureddine Miladi, ‘Satellite TV News and the Arab diaspora in Britain: Comparing Al-Jazeera, the BBC and
CNN’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32:6 (2006), pp. 947–60.
59 Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict resolution: a framework for analysis’ (2009a).
60 Ibid.; Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict resolution’ (2009b).
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Global: CNN International, BBC World, International New York Times
Glocal: Internet based platforms: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube.
The main differentiating criteria are geography, contents, types of audiences and ownerships. The
local media, mostly commercial, reaches very limited audiences who live in a town, a city, or a
district. Local outlets include radio and television stations and local newspapers or community
bulletins. They may carry a few programmes from national outlets on radio and television, but are
mostly interested in local news and features. The next level, the national, both public and com-
mercial, often covers the political boundaries of nation-states. It presents both national and inter-
national news. The latter is usually perceived by editors as relevant to the entire population in a state.
The elite press presents more international news while the popular or tabloid press much less. The
regional, both public and commercial, usually overs an area distinguished by language, history,
culture, or religion such as the Middle East or Latin America. Regional media such as Al Jazeera
Arabic, both reﬂect common regional interests but also deﬁne and reinforce them.
Both the international and the global media reach global audiences. International media present
news and commentary from the perspective of a particular state (at times in languages other than
that of the host country), while global media have no such ofﬁcial allegiance (unofﬁcial allegiances
and frames being another matter). The international media is usually owned by governments
or has some afﬁliation to a governmental agency, while the global media are mostly commercial like
CNN International or a relatively independent outlet such as BBC World. The global media tend
to have more bureaus and reporters than the international media and cover a wider variety of
global issues, while international media tend to cover issues mostly relevant to the states that own
them, and from their narrow or biased perspectives. The nature of global media can also be
demonstrated by the differences in programmes and audiences between CNN-US and CNN
International or between BBC UK and BBC World, where the ﬁrst are national media and the
latter global media.
The glocal level reaches both global and local audiences.61 Glocal presents local knowledge and
information, in the case of this study on conﬂict and peace, in a global context; and global issues in a
local context. Glocal outlets include primarily social media networks with global reach such as
Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and YouTube. The glocal often has stronger elements of advocacy and
human rights bases than their traditional media counterparts. This allows for study of the interaction
effects between media, conﬂict actors, and others engaged in conﬂict settings. The actors include
governments, leaderships of NGOs, and the ‘international community’, which primarily refers to the
United Nations. The media includes all the levels. A simpliﬁed chart of potential interactions is
illustrated in Figure 1.62
61 Victor Roudometof, ‘The glocal and global studies’,Globalizations, 12:5 (2015), pp. 774–87; Hernando Rojas
et al., ‘Theorizing and conducting research of glocal phenomena’, International Journal of Communication, 6
(2012), pp. 232–40; Ho Kin Tonga and Lin Hong Cheunga, ‘Cultural identity and language: a proposed
framework for cultural globalisation and glocalisation’, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Develop-
ment, 32:1 (2011), pp. 55–69; Janet McCabea, ‘Appreciating Wallander at the BBC: Producing culture and
performing the glocal in the UK and Swedish Wallanders for British public service television’, Continuum:
Journal of Media and Cultural Studies, 29:5 (2015), pp. 755–68; Oscar Hemer and Thomas Tufte (eds),Media
& Glocal Change: Rethinking Communication for Development, Clasco Books/NORDICOM (Buenos Aires
and Gothenburg: 2005).
62 Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict resolution: a framework for analysis’ (2009a); Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict reso-
lution’ (2009b).
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Interactions need not be limited to the actors listed here, as there are often multiple sets of conﬂict
actors, public opinions, and competing media and Internet narratives. Figure 1 is designed to
illustrate complementary and researchable interaction effects between medias (for example, how
‘new medias’ inform ‘traditional media’, and vice versa) and between medias and actors at multiple
levels of analysis. It also allows for the fact that media actors themselves can intervene in conﬂicts
and attempt to move them in certain directions, for example, through calls for mediation. Further,
mapping glocal interactions allows scholars to move beyond the traditionally simplistic phases of
preconﬂict, conﬂict, and postconﬂict.
Gilboa also distinguished among four stages of conﬂict based on a critical condition and a
principal intervention goal: onset-prevention, escalation-management, de-escalation-resolution,
and termination-reconciliation.63 Much of existing predominantly Western research focuses on
escalation and conﬂict resolution, while the other not less important phases of prevention
and reconciliation are neglected and under-researched. This bias aligns with the epistemological
conditions affecting conﬂict research in general, where centres of research including think tanks,
universities, and publishing houses, are usually in the Global North, to the deleterious inﬂuence of
research outputs and study foci.64 Focus upon interaction effects at all the media levels and conﬂict
phases can allow researchers to escape from the current traps of conﬂict research, framing analysis in
ways that can display value for all parties involved.
Our multilevel hybridity approach can be applied using both content65 and framing analysis,66
and can involve quantitative analysis67 or qualitative readings of smaller subsamples of media
coverage.68 It also meshes well with political communication models69 and theoretical approaches
Figure 1. A framework for multilevel media analysis.
63 Gilboa, ‘Media and international conﬂict’ (2006); Eytan Gilboa, ‘Media and international conﬂict: a multi-
disciplinary approach’, Journal of Dispute Resolution, 7:1 (2007), pp. 229–37; Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict
resolution: a framework for analysis (2009a)’; Gilboa, ‘Media and conﬂict resolution’ (2009b).
64 Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding, p. 3.
65 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013).
66 Robert M. Entman, ‘Framing US coverage of international news: Contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran
Air incidents’, Journal of Communication, 41:4 (1991), pp. 6–27; Paul D’Angelo, ‘News framing as a mul-
tiparadigmatic research program: a response to Entman’, Journal of Communication, 52:4 (2002), pp. 870–88.
67 Jorg Matthes and Matthias Kohring, ‘The content analysis of media frames: Toward improving reliability and
framing’, Journal of Communication, 58:2 (June 2008), pp. 258–79; Wouter Van Atteveldt and Jan Kleinnijenhuis,
‘Parsing, semantic networks, and political authority: Using syntactic analysis to extract semantic relations from
Dutch newspaper articles’, Political Analysis, 16:4 (2008), pp. 428–46.
68 See, for example, Lilie Chouliaraki, The Spectatorship of Suffering (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006).
69 See, for example, Entman, Projections of Power; Robinson, The CNN Effect; Wolfsfeld, The Media and
Political Conﬂict.
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such as ﬁeld theory,70 and can also succinctly assess political variables against media variables. In
particular, the use of new online news archives71 encourages comparative approaches of both online
and traditional news media formats and holds signiﬁcant promise.
Multilevel hybridity: Five research streams
We visualise ﬁve broad streams of forward research on glocalised conﬂict: from the national level to
the global; from the local to the global; from the glocal to the local; from the global to the global; and
from the near local to the far local. These streams are not designed to serve as a typology of conﬂict
actor engagement with media given the obvious overlap and ﬂuidity of the actors and media sources
themselves. Rather, they are a way to help us understand and contextualise the researchable inter-
actions that are currently taking place.
First, the national level to the global level stream. This stream builds upon and develops the classic
literature on war and media, discussed earlier, and takes seriously the role that powerful states play
in terms of attempting to shape and inﬂuence the communications environment. As part of a top-
down process, powerful states will persistently seek to inﬂuence local, domestic, and global audi-
ences with respect to a conﬂict, especially when core interests are perceived to be at stake. This occurs
most obviously during wars initiated by powerful states, as witnessed in recent years during the
inﬂuential ‘public relations’ campaigns led by the US and UK governments aimed at convincing
domestic and international audiences about the threat posed by Iraq.72 Other recent research has
highlighted the ways in which powerful states shape media and public understandings of conﬂicts
such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide73 and the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict.74 Future research can go
further to study organised persuasive communication75 campaigns by great powers and how these
are variously adopted, contested, or rejected by local, national, and global media.
The stream from the local to the global captures the bottom-up processes whereby local actors build
awareness of conﬂict, often by conﬂict actors themselves, in an attempt to (re)frame international
understandings, agendas, and narratives. Often attempting to highlight material that the ‘traditional
media’ might overlook, local actors drive these streams in an attempt to win international allies
against their domestic opponents. Media-savvy insurgents such as ISIS and the #BringBackOurGirls
campaign against Boko Haram in Nigeria show how both conﬂict actors and engaged international
citizens have used Western media houses and websites as platforms for their attempts to shape and
70 Pierre Bourdieu, On Television and Journalism, translated (London: Pluto Press, 1998).
71 Pablo J. Boczkowski and Martin de Santos, ‘When more media equals less news: Patterns of content homo-
genization in Argentina’s leading print and online newspapers’, Political Communication, 24 (2007), pp. 167–90;
Red Hen Lab, ‘Distributed laboratory for research on multimodal communication’, directed jointly by Francis
Steen and Mark Turner (2013), available at: {https://sites.google.com/site/distributedlittleredhen/}.
72 Eric Herring and Piers Robinson, ‘Report X marks the spot: the British government’s deceptive dossier on Iraq
and WMD’, Political Science Quarterly, 129:4 (2014), pp. 551–83; John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
73 Hazel Cameron, Britain’s Hidden Role in the Rwandan Genocide: the Cat’s Paw (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).
74 Greg Philo and Mike Berry, Bad News from Israel (London, Sterling Virginia: Pluto Press, 2004); Stephanie
Gutmann, The Other War: Israelis, Palestinians and the Struggle for Media Supremacy (San Francisco:
Encounter Books, 2005).
75 Vian Bakir, Eric Herring, David Miller, and Piers Robinson, ‘Organised persuasive communication: a con-
ceptual framework for identifying, situating and challenging propaganda’, Working Paper (2016).
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control international narratives, highlight abuses or celebrate them, and even set agendas for peace
and ceaseﬁre negotiations. Future research could explore how conﬂict actors approach global media
houses, why the houses accept or reject such invitations, what both sets of actors believe is gained by
such interactions, and the forward impact of such activities.
The stream from the glocal to the local consists of uses of global social/news media by local actors,
and how the support they get through these channels is reported back to the ‘rest’ of the local level as
a legitimisation mechanism. It is also a way for international advocacy and humanitarian actors to
show support and solidarity during times of abuses or hardship as well as provide an outlet for
engaged INGOs to ‘Do Something’ in a rapid manner. The belief is that elite international
engagement serves as a de facto watchdog for otherwise vulnerable local actors who might otherwise
be silenced by oppressive regimes, while also allowing international agencies to ‘get local’ in
their engagement. One such example is the use by indigenous communities in Colombia of Twitter
and other social media platforms – ampliﬁed by alliances with media-savvy Western INGOs – to
attempt to inﬂuence Colombian journalists to argue for their inclusion in the ongoing national peace
process. Research could explore the value of international support for local agitation, raising
awareness for government services that operate side-by-side a health INGO’s operations, and the
potential for backﬁre when international chatter undermines governments that rule through
oppression.
The stream from the global to the global is perhaps the most publicly visible today, referring to the
transfer of information between those already heavily networked and connected to global opinion
making. Here we ﬁnd the world’s Twitterati, YouTube conﬂict celebrities, and other non-policymakers
who are assumed to drive public discourse on peace and conﬂict issues, from the anti-slavery
campaigns led by CNN’s Anderson Cooper and Christine Ananpour to the media-heavy roles played
by George Clooney and Angelina Jolie as special representatives to the United Nations. There is a belief
that these celebrity conﬂict tastemakers have the power to inform and encourage action merely
through 140 character blasts to their millions of followers. Research could explore how public
engagement is inﬂuenced by such actors, how ‘going viral’ inﬂuences policy, and if global social media
is merely an echo chamber of elite opinion in areas where few have constant internet access.
The stream from the near local to the far local is perhaps the most hidden to ‘mainstream’ media. It
concerns direct local-local advocacy interactions enabled through the advent of global access to
real-time communications as a change agent. These interactions are not designed to reach large
audiences, but rather engage distant communities with kinship or other ties in a targeted manner.
This can be best illustrated in terms of diaspora engagement. Diaspora involvement in conﬂict,
through supply of human and material resources is not new, but has gained signiﬁcance with new
media and the increased real-time presence that this allows for. However, diaspora populations
contribute in a multitude of small ways in both conﬂict and postconﬂict settings.76 This is perhaps
the least understood communication network of the four, but potentially the most promising, as
76 Marta Bivand Erdal and Kristian Stokke, ‘Contributing to development? Transnational activities among
Tamils in Norway’, Asian and Paciﬁc Migration Journal, 18:3 (2009), pp. 397–418; Jørgen Carling, Marta
Bivand Erdal, and Cindy Horst, ‘How does conﬂict in migrants’ country of origin affect remittance-sending?
Financial priorities and transnational obligations among Somalis and Pakistanis in Norway’, International
Migration Review, 46:2 (2012), pp. 283–309; Michelle Martin, ‘Ethnonationalist conﬂict-generated diaspora
use of social media in transnational political engagement in homeland conﬂict: the case of Rwanda’ (PhD
thesis, University of Bradford, 2014).
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these interactions often provide space for less extreme diaspora actors, whose voices are often
ignored or shouted away by their radical counterparts in the media, to positively contribute away
from the glare of international media.
Whilst these ﬁve streams serve as a starting point for research, the concept of hybridity reminds us
that mediated events and conﬂict resolution across these different levels bleed into and mutually
inﬂuence each other and are both ﬂuid and interrelated. For example, a violent event within a conﬂict
zone may be mediated through global media as a major atrocity that then shapes policy responses at
the international level.77 Alternatively, lack of exposure to a crisis or coverage that distances both the
public and policymakers from a particular conﬂict, may signiﬁcantly hamper attempts by interna-
tional actors to pursue conﬂict resolution strategies. Within the contemporary information envir-
onment, as local actors respond to international reactions, and international actors respond to local
events, reciprocal and dynamic patterns of inﬂuence emerge and evolve. Research could explore the
ways in which real-time communication is being used within near-local to far-local interactions, and
what implications these new forms of communication have for affecting change. Future work can
reﬁne the nature of these streams, discover new ones, and seek to understand their comparative
inﬂuence on policy for given types of conﬂicts or humanitarian disasters. These ﬂows can serve as
useful tools to better approach the media-conﬂict realities that currently unfold.
Conclusion
This study has identiﬁed the shortcomings of existing research paradigms on media-conﬂict relations.
The CNN effect framework was a useful tool to understand the effects of global news television
networks on the conﬂicts of the post-Cold War era. Yet the dramatic changes in the communication
and conﬂict worlds of this century, and the speed by which events reach an international audience
and the proliferation of media sources have not only impacted upon how media actors relate to
conﬂicts, but more broadly, on how we as publics and policymakers understand, interpret, and
respond to conﬂict situations. In particular, patterns of media multiplication and fragmentation,
coupled with advances in news technologies have injected considerable uncertainty and potential
ﬂuidity regarding media-conﬂict interactions in which, more than ever, local-level conﬂict and media
dynamics demand analytical and empirical attention. Media is not only a vehicle to inform about
conﬂicts, but has also become inherent within conﬂict dynamics. It is therefore important to increase
awareness about this co-constitutive relationship through sustained, comprehensive research about
the interaction effects of media in contemporary conﬂict environments.
The multilevel hybridity approach introduced in this study has the capacity to describe and explain
how new global communication connectivity inﬂuences the dynamic and complex media-conﬂict
relationship. The connection between the external and the internal in this hybridity approach is
integrated with the six levels of media in order to emphasise the local and the glocal in addition to the
national and global dimensions, which traditionally have been the focus of conﬂict and media
research including the CNN effect debate. In support, we have outlined several potential forward
research directions that prioritise interdisciplinary approaches and close dialogue with practitioners.
When combined with systematic applications to case studies in all regions of the world, we can
77 Maria Gabrielsen, ‘Mobilisations pour le Sud-Soudan et le Darfour: Émergence d’un mouvement transnational’
[‘Mobilizations for South Sudan and Darfur: emergence of a transnational movement’], Outre Terre, 3:20 (2008),
pp. 391–403.
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further unpack these new ties and yield stronger understanding of the contemporary relationship
between media and conﬂict.
Utilising the approach mapped out in this article, future research can address a number of pressing
questions: to what extent, if at all, has power diffused away from states and other powerful actors
seeking to mobilise support and gain strategic advantage? Have developments in news gathering
technology, the emergence of social media, and the ubiquity of personal mobile communication
enhanced or diminished the potential for timely response to conﬂict and humanitarian crisis? In what
ways do the global and glocal media dimensions enhance the ability of actors both within and
outside conﬂict zones, for example, diasporas, to promote their agendas, and how does this in turn
shape global and international responses? Using our approach to explore these and other questions
could signiﬁcantly help to advance our understanding of media-conﬂict interactions in the
contemporary era.
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